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The Limit: a Fundamental Question for the Subject in the Human 
Experience  
Willy Apollon 
GIFRIC  
 
From oneself to the Other, from the unpresentable quest of desire to the space of the 
receivable structured by the social link, from the audible (where the time of the quest is 
structured) to the visible (where the absence of its object reveals itself), the human lacerates 
itself in the impossible articulation of a passage to the limit.   Borders that are forever to be 
reconstructed recount something that is impossible to say, in the process of which each one of 
us ceaselessly redefines his or her position in the difficult response to the only question that 
counts : “ up to what point can I go too far, without cutting myself off from others ? “1 
 
In a recent documentary about the 388, the center for the psychoanalytic treatment of 
young psychotics that Gifric has created in Quebec City, Dr. Danielle Bergeron, the 
director of the center, made a remark that will serve as an essential theoretical 
reference for the problematic that I will develop here.  She drew attention to the fact 
that scientific data, the theoretical problematics and the clinical approaches that they 
refer to, are all based on observation, whereas the psychoanalytic clinic and the 
metapsychology that founds its ethical practice are instead founded on experience that 
belongs as much to the clinicians as to the subjects of psychoanalysis.  Reference to an 
experience that cannot be the object of either observation or experimentation by a 
third party is decisive today in the debate that opposes psychoanalysis to those so-called 
scientific approaches that contradict it.   
It is important to measure the radical difference between these theoretical and 
clinical approaches, which indicate two points of view that, in many ways, pose two 
opposite conceptions of human reality.   Dialogue between these two conceptions is not 
only desirable, but necessary. But first, they must be correctly located and positioned.  
My position here will be to emphasize that the problem is not simply a matter of two 
opposing conceptions or philosophies.  Rather, the problem has to do with the 
expression of two fundamental dimensions of the human experience.  My aim here will 
be to explore these two dimensions of experience, which, in a certain fashion, both 
nullify and found the question of borders on the side of observation, and the question of 
limits on the side of subjective experience.  
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Scientific observation places the human subject in the position of an object—one 
thing among others in a space that is defined and controlled.  Psychology, psychiatry, 
medicine, and a whole host of other disciplines that are of less concern to us here, all 
understand the individual and his or her behavior and social conduct—or the parts of 
the individual and their behaviors—as things, as objects that are observable in a space 
where the rules of acceptable behavior for such objects are defined for those who 
observe them.  Whether observation is direct or technologically assisted, it remains the 
case that one cannot separate the results of the study from the rules that govern and 
define both the modalities of the gaze and the analysis of the observer—either for the 
scientist or the clinician who bases her approach on science. Indeed, the human sciences 
are aligned, almost exclusively, with the model of the natural sciences, and particularly 
with biology.  Their data is collected in the same way, such that whether it is collected 
by direct observation or by technologically assisted observation, the observations will 
have been determined by a community of observers who define the framework of its 
reception.  It is from within this scientific framework that the notion of conclusive 
evidence derives its prestige.  The individual is reduced to scientific data that sanctions 
the status of a thing within a scientifically controlled, defined space: he is reduced to his 
conduct, the behavior of the parts of which he is composed. It is important to 
underscore the fundamental dimension of nomination [la nomination] within this 
operation—namely, the observation of an object. Technically assisted observation, 
which can take on extremely complicated technical dimensions, realizes its essential 
function only in partitioning reality with all the rigor that contemporary computer 
science and mathematics allow.  Indeed, each section of this partitioned observable 
reality can be reduced to analyzable numbers that can be used to construct computer 
models.  The naming of each section of observed, or potentially observable, reality, or 
even of each piece of each section of reality, can and must sustain the illusion of a reality 
that is technically reconstructed, and which is thus susceptible to a corrective 
intervention.  What is underestimated in this operation, once it passes from the scientist 
to the practitioner, is that being can no more be reduced to what is observable than the 
individual can be reduced to his image in the mirror.  The illusion that sustains such an 
error is without doubt a particular instance of confusing the internal limits of science 
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with the boundaries that must define the relationship between science and the practices 
claimed by it.   
This is a human problem whose foundation in experience we must explore with 
respect to what psychoanalysis today allows us to say about this experience.  To do this, 
we must return to the stakes of what psychoanalysis has traditionally designated as the 
Freudian stages of the development of the child—not so much to give a new account, 
but to defend the hypothesis of what is logically implied in the experience of the human 
being.  Indeed, the problematic of the stages of a child’s development is generally 
presented as a discourse that wants to be scientific and that takes account of the 
observations of psychoanalysts and of others who claim this approach.  Such 
observations, and the excellent research that has sustained them and is still being 
promoted today in order to better understand the development of the child, deserve all 
of our attention.  But parallel to these observations, the psychoanalysis of the child 
introduces a number of questions that add to these observations a dimension that is not 
reducible to development.  These questions bear very precisely on what is at stake for 
the child, which these observations can never account for. 
 
The Audible: the Rupture of the Spirit 
To introduce these questions I will refer to Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage and 
Freud’s phallic stage.  These references allow for highly effective hypotheses, both 
theoretical and clinical, regarding the experience of the child both before and after the 
mirror stage, and during and after the phallic phase.  Lacan’s mirror stage is concerned 
with the moment that the child recognizes himself in the image at which his mother 
smiles in the mirror.  This observation is especially important insofar as it introduces a 
logical question that does not belong, precisely, to the order of the observable.  To 
sustain this line of questioning I will first consider the period before the mirror stage, 
when the child is barely able to distinguish forms in the masses of light and shadow.   
We have often mentioned that the child enters into humanity through the 
distinction that he necessarily experiences in his being, well before he is conscious of it, 
between the father’s voice and all the sounds that accompany his embryonic existence 
within his mother.  This voice distinguishes itself in that it has specific effects in the 
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uterine environment of the child, as much through the drive responses of the mother to 
this voice, as through the incalculable effects of these affective and drive reactions of the 
mother on the neurophysiological formation and functioning in which the development 
of the child is engaged.   
The strangeness of this voice, its exteriority with respect to everything that 
generates sounds in the uterine environment of the child, and its effects on this 
environment will no doubt cause the child who is yet to be born to be resensitized to 
the voice of the mother as distinct from the sounds of the neurophysiological 
functioning of the different organs that are in play in this uterine environment. This 
surging forth of the audible in the living being and in the child’s universe determines his 
entrance into humanity, or its birth into what we traditionally call the spirit (where the 
French esprit, much like the German Geist, designates both the “mind” and the “spirit,” 
or the spiritual dimension of the mind). 
Without going more into detail about the event that marks the first 
humanization of the child to be born, I want to discuss the primordial temporality of 
mental representation within it.   A common confusion consists in taking the mental 
image for a mental representation.  The former presupposes visual perception.  The 
mental image reproduces, within the interior silence of the living being, the perception 
of an object in the space in which its environment is structured.  As such, the mental 
image is the reproduction within consciousness of an external visual perception.  What 
we call consciousness is constituted through this capacity for reproduction, which 
allows the living being to position itself in space.  But the fundamental point we must 
emphasize here is that the perception at stake in the mental image is not only visual, but 
is sustained by a process of nomination that identifies as specific a form in the 
environment.  Indeed, for the mental image to be possible, not only must the form that 
it reproduces be perceived, but this visual perception must be able to be replaced by the 
simple statement of the name of the perceived reality.  The mental representation is not 
sustained by any form that is perceived in the reality of the environment.  It subsists in 
the pure time of its enunciation, independent of all perception.  It is constituted in the 
audible, without the support of a perception that would attach it to some entity within 
the environmental space.  Indeed, there is a complete and total difference between 
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naming a tree, a cat, the light or anything else that a visual perception could support in 
reality, and naming a god, an angel, or tenderness, for example, which are pure mental 
representations without any perceptual support in reality.  The mental representation is 
constituted within the field of the audible that structures human temporality, just as 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony cannot be reduced to any factual account that would 
attempt to make it visible.  It is a veritable effraction of the living being, which opens 
onto a dimension where things escape its control. 
First, the child is confronted by the mental representation in its specifically 
auditory dimension. Nothing of what he can perceive corresponds to this auditory event 
that traverses his body and which is for him the object carried by the voice of the 
Other.  The fact remains that this object of the voice, with respect to which he is 
powerless, defenseless, and without recourse, is not without effects that at times ravage 
both the being of his mother and his own being.  It is this originary time that we suggest 
should be considered as the experience that overdetermines everything that is 
otherwise observable in the behavior of the child in the oral stage.  This radical 
experience of the confrontation with the audible and the management of its effect of 
effraction in his being is without a doubt at the origin of the constitution of the child’s 
body, and above all requires more investment of energy than even feeding, which finds 
itself subverted.  The manuals of biology and neurophysiology have habituated us to a 
logic of functioning considered natural to the organism.  Their strategies are taken from 
observation and from experiments that tend to make observation more precise in order 
to make it more clinically profitable.  But they remain silent about what they can neither 
observe nor experiment upon, but which we cannot logically ignore.  The work entailed 
in the child’s confrontation with the audible and his management of its consequences 
overdetermines the formation of his body (as the site of this effraction) and its 
detachment from the organism, making it function at times according to a logic that has 
more to do with the effects of the audible than with the neurophysiological logic.  
This surging forth of the spirit or mind in the subversion of his biological being 
forms the basis for the child of what will be later experienced as an absence of 
boundaries, on the one hand between the spiritual (the subversion of the audible) and 
the biological, and, on the other hand, between the psychical, or the being’s reaction to 
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the effraction, and the spirit or body.  Where the object of our discussions is 
concerned, it is in this primordial time that the subjective conditions of the experience 
of the limit are decided, in the places where fundamentally no boundary is conceivable.  
The time of the living being’s effraction by the audible, the pure mental representation, 
can prove to be very painful, and even terrifying for the being at the dawn of his 
existence.  From the neurotic to the psychotic and from the psychotic to the autistic 
these questions of boundaries and limits have not ceased to preoccupy clinicians, both 
analysts and others.  Depending upon whether one trusts observational data or the logic 
of the experience, the opposing responses introduce boundaries along with the 
designation of the observable.  Here also, we must go back to the source.   
 
The Mother Tongue 
For the child who is grappling with the effraction of the audible, the function of 
the mother is very rapidly put in place.  In the animal, the female is the progenitor, she 
engenders a being in a physically determined environment.  The woman is a mother, she 
engenders the human being in the audible, in the effraction of the physical by a 
dimension that is neither presentable, nor observable, nor experimental, and that 
transcends the physical and confronts the being with an original response that is not an 
adaptation.  It is also true that the ethical conduct of the human mother cannot be 
calculated or studied through the behavior of an animal progenitor.   
Beyond extending the affective, corporeal uterine environment, the mother 
names things to permit the child to access visual perception, which is the basis of 
consciousness and of the construction of space.  Little by little all the objects in the 
immediate environment will be named and situated by the mother.  Thus a space is 
constituted out of things that are seen because they are named and which can come to 
occupy the imagination and the consciousness of the child.  This constitution of 
perceptible space by the mother tongue frees the child from the bewildering and 
frightening hold of the audible.  It is certainly true that the words that name the 
environmental world for the child and that situate him among the things furnishing the 
space that he will, from then on, inhabit, have an audible dimension.  They are the 
objects of the maternal voice.  But at the same time, these words reflect something that 
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the child perceives in space.  They are not pure objects of the audible that traverse the 
subjective time of the child, which neither he nor his mother can grasp, and with respect 
to which he is without recourse.  Within the mother tongue, words join the audible to a 
visual perception where that which is heard has its effects limited by perception itself.  
This limit is much more important in that it is overdetermined by an entire culture.  The 
mother tongue not only creates the space of visual perception that marks out for the 
child the effect of the effraction of the audible; it articulates the surging forth of spirit to 
consciousness such as it is defined within a given culture.  Through the mother tongue, 
the child perceives that which is named within his culture.  By naming things and by 
structuring space the mother tongue articulates the consciousness of the child to a 
historical culture, which offers in itself a boundary to the audible and to mental 
representation.   
In opening the child to the space of perception and to the consciousness of 
things, the mother’s speech allows him to be born into the symbolic, to that part of the 
audible that rules the lives of humans, that detaches them from the physical environment 
in order to plunge them into the universe of the spirit where the things said and wished 
for, indeed the things that are imposed upon us, do not have any consistency in 
observable and experimentable reality and are not objects of science.  This act of 
engendering the child in the symbolic also forms the ground of what Freudians call 
repression.  It is indeed in this domain of pure mental representation that a historical 
society makes the choices that mark the life of each of its members.  In putting in place 
the mother tongue, the mother’s speech determines for the child the radical difference 
between what is heard and said without being present to visual perception and that thus 
escapes all control, and what constitutes the space of the collective and individual 
consciousness, where what is said can be seen and falls under the control of the Other.  
This specific experience to which the child is led by the mother’s speech conditions the 
child’s experience of the limits between himself, others, and things, such as those that 
confront him in the stakes of the mirror stage and the anal stage.   
This constitution of the space of perceptible things by the mother’s speech 
leaves intact, to a certain point, the universe of the audible, where the mental 
representation of the object of the voice continues its work in the child’s being.  The 
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child is therefore confronted by a double universe, that of things said, and by virtue of 
being named rendered perceptible and delivered to consciousness, and that of things 
heard, which provoke anxiety and remain outside of what is named in the mother 
tongue and not presentable to visual perception.  This second universe risks, at every 
moment, contaminating the first, thus introducing anxiety and compromising security.  
The things in the perceptible universe can thus lose their consistency if the universe 
created by the mother tongue is contaminated or penetrated by the universe of mental 
representations.  The border between these two universes appears porous.  To protect 
themselves from the universe of the audible, from the moment they experience the 
construction of a space of nameable and perceivable things, some children, in particular 
autistic children, can develop an attitude of rejection with respect to the audible.  The 
perceptible then overtakes the audible, to the point of trying to eliminate it, in order to 
protect the being from the effects of the signifier of the Other.  Despite the logical 
function of the mother’s speech in articulating a share of the audible in the constitution 
of the space of the perceptible, for these children such an operation seems to lead to 
nothing but a blurring of the borders that separate the mental representation and its 
effects in the body from the universe of things that visual perception presents to 
consciousness.  To limit the action of the audible that he cannot control, it becomes 
logical to reduce to a minimum the possible contacts with the Other.   
 
From the Lack in the Other to the Object of Desire 
Indeed, the mother’s speech supports the child in producing a space of 
perception that conditions its consciousness of being in the world.  This speech also 
introduces the child to the difference between the space where he perceives the things 
that are said and the intimate temporality in which he grapples with the things that are 
heard but which he cannot perceive.  The child is certainly not conscious of this 
difference, which is not without effects in his body, but he must nonetheless manage the 
consequences of this difference.  In particular, the child cannot not search the space of 
visual perception for that which is heard without being named in the mother’s speech.  
Something in his lived experience escapes being named by the mother’s speech.  And 
that which is thus lacking in the space of perception continues to subvert, in his body, 
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the logic of the organism.  Both the mass of food and the mass of excrement return him 
to the lived experiences that do not necessarily fall under the nomination of maternal 
speech.  But these internal objects, in particular the mass of excrement, may 
nonetheless sustain for the child a certain relation to the audible and to its effects on his 
being in the world, of things that are heard and that are not perceptible in space that act 
on his being.   
It is at a specific moment between the sixteenth and eighteenth month that the 
mirror stage, first identified by Henri Wallon as an apparatus that promotes the 
unification of the body image, then taken up by Jacques Lacan to articulate the formation 
of the ‘I,’ comes into effect.   We must here take the mirror stage into consideration to 
detail the logic of the experience that imposes itself on the child.  Many things have been 
written after Lacan and Dolto about what can be observed, or even experimented on, in 
this decisive moment of the formation of the subject of speech.  What I want to draw 
your attention to here is a particular experience that the child must manage at a precise 
moment.  Indeed, we could advance the logical hypothesis that the child who comes into 
contact with the mirror as the specific site of production of the perceptible seeks in vain 
for the image of what is heard but not presentable in the space of reality constituted by 
his mother’s speech.   We must not underestimate this hypothesis.  In the same fashion, 
the child will not perceive, in the mirror, the image of what he feels, in particular the 
image of the effects of the signifier on his being.  Thus, the experience of the mirror—
where the child, like everyone else, is only dealing with one half of the image of the 
bodily surface—will be a primordial experience of lack for the child.  He searches in the 
mirror, just as he has searched in the reality established in his mother tongue, for the 
object carried by the voice, for an image that would make the audible perceptible for 
him, and that he does not find.  It is probably his first experience of lack, of a specific 
form of lack in the space of reality that mobilizes in him a quest that structures his 
subjective time.  Once again, the fact that the child is not conscious of the phenomenon 
that escapes our observation, but which the logic of experience imposes, does not at all 
prevent this quest for the unpresentable that is created in him by the audible, by the 
signifier that came from the Other, from being henceforth at the heart of his life.  Thus 
another scene is established, which Freud calls the unconscious, over which the child 
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has no control, and where all that is essential in his life, his desire, the irrepressible 
quest for an unpresentable object, will be decided. 
This is how what psychoanalysis calls the object, the object of desire in 
particular, is determined in the first months of life.  It is first and foremost a lack 
introduced at the heart of the being by the word, as the unpresentable object of the 
voice of the Other, that makes a hole in the psychic space and that mobilizes the drive in 
an impossible quest to satisfy itself within reality.  What is introduced by the signifier of 
the Other remains in the subjective time of the audible, below the space of the 
perceptible things created by the mother tongue.  Inaccessible to perception, its absence 
articulates itself to presence itself and rips apart any relationship between the child’s 
subjective temporality and the space where he is required to recognize the things that 
are named by others.  His human spirit articulates itself to this absence and this ripping 
apart, with no barrier against what is at play in his body as a response and a reaction of 
the drive to his failed quest for the object introduced in his life by the signifier of the 
Other.  The wound of the effraction of his being by the object that comes from the 
voice of the Other is managed in a singular fashion by the autistic.  To protect himself 
he will go to the point of eliminating the very possibility of reentering into a relation 
with this voice.   
The relationship of the child to the fecal mass takes on a special strategic 
signification.  In the relationship to what his body can produce and expel as an object, at 
first imperceptible but named as a thing in the space of the mother tongue, the child 
achieves a certain control over what the signifier of the Other ‘introduces’ in him.  For a 
time the feces can have the function of representing, in space, the lacking object that is 
the product of the signifier.  The control of the feces, which for the observer is toilet 
training that inserts the child in the social link, takes on a dimension for the child that is 
totally different, and much more fundamental.  For him it has to do both with managing 
his relationship with the mental representation, that object fallen from the voice of the 
Other, and with trying to exert control over, or to escape from, the effect of this thing 
on his being.  His dietary problems and his digestive problems can have a meaning that is 
completely different from their meaning for medical science. 
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The child, in quest of a limit to the effect that the signifier of the Other has on 
his being, experiences the powerlessness of his parents with respect to the cause of his 
anxiety.  No appeal for help seems to be able to provide him relief from this captivation 
by the audible where the signifier of the Other governs what he can have access to.  
Above all, an incalculable part of his energy is diverted and torn away, mobilized by the 
signifier that came from the Other to invest this inaccessible object, stricken from the 
space of perceptible things, this unnamed object that is excluded from the mother 
tongue.  This energy that ravishes the living being through the surging up of the spirit 
within the audible is what Freud names the drive, to distinguish it from the instinct that 
articulates the being into the environmental space structured by the mother tongue.  
The child experiences this drive, which invests the mental representation of the object 
of the voice, as a part of his being that is ravished by the voice of the Other. The loss 
that the child suffers at the hands of the Other returns his anxious search for a limit to 
the power of the Other, if not to the signifier, to dispose of his life.   It introduces a 
logical question for the child, who will want to know just how much too far the Other 
will go in disposing of his energy and his life. The relation of the child to the Other takes 
on a primordial dimension, more determining of his existence than what defines his 
entrance into the social link. 
 
Language, Oedipus and the Phallus 
The moment comes when the child is inevitably confronted with paternal 
speech, or with its substitute.  This speech is alien to the nomination of things that 
institutes the space of visual perception, and introduces instead the rules that define the 
distinctions between the positions in the family, and the possible relations between the 
members of the small social group.  By the mere fact of his presence, in the difference of 
his position with respect to the child’s relationship with the body and the discourse of 
the mother, the father introduces the fact of language.  From the very start the mode of 
his relationship with both the mother and the child supposes rules.  Their entrance into 
play at the moment when the child can finally free himself from the exclusivity of his 
relationship to the mother introduces the child into a space ordered by rules and no 
longer only by the object of the voice and its effects in his body.  This situation upsets 
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the relationship of the child both to the space of conscious perception and to the 
intimate rhythm of his lived temporality that is imposed by the signifier.  The child must 
make his entrance into the social link, unless like the autistic child he has already 
renounced it.   
This strategic moment is articulated by Freud in what it is customary to call the 
Oedipal complex.  Here again the observation of the child’s behavior and the worry that 
one should intervene to make the behavior conform to both familial expectations and 
social ideals can distance us from a consideration of what is supposed in the logic of the 
child’s experience, insofar as the adult can rediscover that logic in the course of analysis.  
In fact, in his experience the child will encounter, in this entrance into language, limits, 
psychic territories and borders imposed by the very structure of the social link.  All 
human society defines itself by determining in some way what part of the mental 
representation caused by the audible will determine the conditions of coexistence.  One 
could say that society organizes itself by defining which mental representations will be 
receivable in society and which will be excluded.  One of the characteristics of our 
epoch is that it is ripped apart by a confrontation of civilizations. Societal choices about 
values and mental representations have overdetermined the historical development of 
those societies forced into mutual confrontation by globalization, dividing them to such 
an extent that the choices are themselves in peril. The ideals, the values, the customs, 
the norms, and the prohibitions that structure the social link in one society, can be in 
direct opposition with those that structure another society.  The clash between 
societies is thus founded on radical oppositions derived from the audible, more than on 
simple economic stakes.  
The child in the Oedipal stage suffers the shock of the encounter with language 
that structures the social link by imposing unjustifiable rules on the space of conscious 
perception in the mother tongue.  These rules, ideals, values, and prohibitions are based 
on the historical choices that a society makes about the mental representations that 
result from religious or other beliefs, but are not founded on the perceptual reality that 
balasts consciousness.  Indeed, the social link into which he must enter is structured by 
the audible, the signifier of the Other, but not by the same signifier of the Other that 
haunted his spirit and mobilized his energies until now.  He is faced with a choice of 
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mental representations that are determined by his parents and by society, and by the 
radical rejection of the other representations that are active in him, mobilizing his drives 
or already invested by them.  An important part of his being thus finds itself rejected, 
censured, and banished from all representation in the social link.  He has already 
experienced the impossibility of finding, in the space of perceptual reality, the object that 
his desire has sought out ever since the effraction of the audible in him; now, he must 
confront the censor that banishes it from the social link, where an important share of 
his quest must evolve. In the limits imposed by the minimal social link into which he 
enters, the child nonetheless finds balasts and barriers for the anxiety created by the 
effraction of the audible and the effects produced in him by the signifier of the Other.  It 
falls to him, however, to manage these boundaries introduced by the rules that govern 
the social link.   
In this period of childhood the Oedipal complex is structure of the minimal, but 
very effective, social link where he must evolve to make himself recognized as a member 
of society who counts for others and on whom they can count. Generally, observations 
of this period accent the consequences of love and rivalry governing the child’s behavior 
with respect to his parents.  But one can also consider that these behaviors are merely 
the observable consequences of more fundamental stakes.  Through the minimal social 
link that he must negotiate, the child does not deal directly with the cultural ideals, 
values and prohibitions, but rather with the parental interpretation of these ideals, 
values, and prohibitions.  The parental interpretations, which can sometimes pervert 
these values and ideals, are largely influenced by the dissatisfactions of adults.  The 
unsatisfied desires, the censured representations and aspirations, fruitless investments of 
the drive that inhabit the imaginary of the parents are so many filters that, in the form of 
superegoic exigencies, confuse themselves with and transform the values and the ideals 
that are promoted by familial education. The child is unable to distinguish the demands 
resulting from parental dissatisfaction from the cultural exigencies to which everyone is 
submitted.  What adults identify as the child’s love or jealousy or rivalry with respect to 
his parents would benefit from being considered in the light of his need to be recognized 
and counted by adults, whose exigencies, words, attitudes, silences, angers, joys, and so 
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many acts—perceived and interpreted without their knowing—the child must take into 
account. 
At the center of this key historical moment in his quest for a place and a 
recognition in the social link, what imposes itself on the child for the first time with the 
identification of rules, limits, and boundaries that seem the same for all, is the need to 
express his quest for something other than what is offered in the social link.  Without 
his being conscious of it himself, a logical phase imposes itself on him, which is defined 
by the need to find a place and a form of expression for these representations that 
inhabit and structure his subjective time, mobilizing his drive and making his existence 
alien to the social link where he is invited to take his place.  He must find the words that 
will carry his childish quest into the adults’ space, with some chance of being rejected 
beyond the demands that are imposed upon him.  This important period in the phallic 
phase gives the child a chance to risk his singularity in the space of the social link, 
breaking with the meaning of things that its rules determine through the rupture that 
the signification of his desires as a child introduces into it.  Indeed, the law of the father 
that supports the censuring of non-receivable representations is also what authorizes 
the child to try to negotiate his subjective difference by making a breach in the space 
that ties him to the mother.  As the child negotiates, in his relationship with his parents, 
the difference that makes him a stranger to their demands and their expectations, he 
will encounter obstacles.  These obstacles will be translated in his body through the 
modality of the symptom.  What haunts his unconscious to the point of separating him 
from others, what cannot be said, will take the form of the symptom in order to 
express itself despite everything. 
Indeed, the analytic experience teaches us that the audible, the mental 
representation that does not have access to the space of conscious perception, and all 
the drives that it mobilizes in the body, form the active center of what is at work in the 
unconscious.  They determine the logic of our acts, reactivating what was censured 
from the social link in childhood, and sustaining the quest for a mode or a form of 
expression negotiable either in our acts and in the positions we take, or in the 
symptoms that express the logic of the fantasy where the audible is given visibility.  In 
any case, with or without our participation these pulsional investments of mental 
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representation and of the censured express themselves in one way or another.  This 
structural fact is translated in the experience of the child and the adolescent by the 
feeling of estrangement from the values and ideals that society demands and expects 
from them.  They desire something else.  The singularity of their interior functioning 
confirms them in a position of subjective exception with respect to the norm.  For 
them, beginning with Oedipal childhood, this exceptional character of their subjective 
position finds a signification only in the overstepping of common positions.  It is not a 
matter of transgression for them, despite the scandalous dimension that the reference 
to a sanction sometimes gives it. The limit that they evaluate and calculate in their own 
experience of desire and in their passion for what the drive in them invests as mental 
representation, goes beyond what is receivable in the social space in which they evolve.   
The confrontation with disapproval and the sanction it elicits signifies at the 
beginning of adolescence a blurring of the boundaries that separate it from childhood.  It 
is in adolescence that the will to live and to face up to what the phallus already 
emblematized in childhood takes shape.  The unconscious singularities that justified for 
the child subject his exceptional position with respect to the ideals and the prohibitions 
through which others anchored him to the social link founded his refusal to participate 
or to obey as well as his will to be recognized in his difference.  These singularities 
inevitably lead him beyond the limits considered acceptable within the family or at 
school.  Demanding to be recognized, the child in this singular position refuses to have 
his breaking of acceptable limits reduced to a simple transgression.  He then definitively 
sets out on a path that will lead him out of childhood.  He realizes, sometimes with 
terror, that the boundaries that separate him from adolescence are within him, 
inseparable from his desire for something other than what the social link offers.  
Childhood discovers in itself its own limit when the position of exception where it is 
placed by the singularities of the unconscious renders insoluble the conflict that opposes 
him to others in the social link.  This moment is the one that strikes the observer who 
interrogates the child’s social and familiar behaviors.  For his part, the child knows very 
well that nothing will be as it was before, when he can no longer shrink back from that 
question whose response will cast him into the arena of his life completely alone:  “Up 
to what point can I go too far without cutting myself off from others?” 
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Translated by Daniel Wilson 
 
                                                 
1 The following is the general abstract for the essays by Apollon, Bergeron, and Cantin in 
this Special Issue: “In the mode of the numerical analysis of partial differential equations 
in the mathematics of the nineteenth century, the question of the limit takes on, in 
psychoanalysis today, a historic dimension within the particular field of the clinic of the 
psychoses.   But the interest of this question goes beyond the mere field of the 
psychoses.  More radically, it introduces us to a properly human dimension.   In fact, this 
question of the limit refers us to a subjective experience  that confronts the singular 
being with an impossibility, the stakes of which are perfectly expressed in the more 
generalizable notion of the border [frontière].   In psychoanalysis, the problematic of the 
limit introduces us to three determinate dimensions.  The psychic dimension opens 
onto questions concerning the autonomy of the psychic structures and their borders.  
These questions, which divide psychoanalysts, turn around the notion of the possible or 
impossible passage from one structure to another.  A properly clinical dimension, 
concerning the practices of psychoanalysts, introduces us to the question of the limits of 
such practices.  This question is subverted today by the most recent advances in the 
psychoanalysis of the psychoses in Quebec.  Finally, the ethical dimension, unavoidable 
today, imposes between the scientist and the politician the stakes of desire, i.e. of the 
desirable [le souhaitable], between the possible and the impossible on the one hand, and 
between the censured and the receivable on the other hand.” 
 
